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Abstract
Previously  we developed a type system to ensure secure
information ow in a sequential  imperative programming
language VSI Program variables are classied as ei
ther high or low security	 intuitively  we wish to prevent
information from owing from high variables to low vari
ables Here  we extend the analysis to deal with a multi
threaded language We show that the previous type system
is insu
cient to ensure a desirable security property called
noninterference Noninterference basically means that the
nal values of low variables are independent of the initial
values of high variables By modifying the sequential type
system  we are able to guarantee noninterference for con
current programs Crucial to this result  however  is the use
of purely nondeterministic thread scheduling Since imple
menting such scheduling is problematic  we also show how
a more restrictive type system can guarantee noninterfer
ence  given a more deterministic and easily implementable
scheduling policy  such as roundrobin time slicing Finally 
we consider the consequences of adding a clock to the lan
guage
  Introduction
The success of mobile code technologies depends in large
part on what kinds of security guarantees can be made for
clients executing the code Among the concerns here is en
suring that code respects a clients privacy  so that sensitive
information is not improperly disclosed Current software
approaches to security address the issue of protecting pri
vacy by introducing protection domains and access privi
leges The basic idea is to specify  via a security policy  a
set of privileges for a piece of code based on its digital sig
nature A check is then made for a certain access privilege
when the code attempts to cross a domain boundary  say
for example if it attempts to access the local le system If
the privilege has been granted  execution proceeds Keep
in mind that the decision is made here against a security
policy for the codes signature  not the code itself This is
the approach taken in the security architecture of the Java
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Developers Kit JDK  GMPS and in the extended
stack introspection proposal of WBDF
But suppose we can prove that a program satises a se
cure information ow property that guarantees that the pro
gram respects private information Then there is no need to
check at runtime whether the code has permission to read
private information	 we can simply trust it  since the prop
erty guarantees that the information will not be improperly
disclosed This is the approach taken in this paper We are
interested in developing a type system for a concurrent pro
gramming language and exploring the secureow properties
that can be shown to hold for all welltyped programs With
such a type system  code can be type checked for secureow
violations just once Code that type checks can be allowed
to run and access private information without any further
checks
 
Type checking might be done by a clients security
architecture Another way it might be done is at a code cer
tication site For example  eorts are underway at some
companies in the US to certify the security of Java com
pilation units used in electronic commerce servers It is
understandable why consumer condence is low here given
the rash of stolen credit card numbers despite the use of
encryption Such a site might apply a type checker as an
initial step in certifying code
This paper continues our earlier work VSI  VSb 
VSa on the relationship between typing  security proper
ties  and semantics  but now in a concurrent setting The
paper presents the following results
 We show that the type system of VSI is no longer
su
cient to guarantee a desirable security property 
called noninterference  if we add threads to our lan
guage The noninterference property is intended to
assert that information cannot ow from high vari
ables to low variables	 basically  it says that the nal
values of low variables are independent of the initial
values of high variables
 We show that the noninterference property can be re
stored in a multithreaded language by requiring the
guards of while loops to have type low and by re
quiring while loops themselves to have type low cmd
Conditionals do not need to be restricted This is
the main result of the paper
 Crucial to the above result  however  is the use of
purely nondeterministic thread scheduling It is not
 
We do not mean to suggest that such a type system would address
all security concerns  Integrity properties for instance might well be
best handled by code signing 

clear how such scheduling can be implemented in prac
tice We show that with more deterministic schedul
ing  such as roundrobin time slicing which is used in
the implementation of Java threads in Windows NT
  the noninterference property does not hold We
show that noninterference can be restored  regardless
of the scheduling policy used  by also requiring the
guards of conditionals to have type low
 We consider adding a clock to the language We show
that unless the clock is given type high  noninterference
is not preserved
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows In
Section   we give an example that shows that the type sys
tem of VSI is insu
cient to ensure noninterference in a
multithreaded language In Sections  and   we formally
dene the semantics of our multithreaded language and its
type system Then  in Section   we prove that the type sys
tem guarantees the noninterference property In Section  
we explore how adding a clock to the language aects the
noninterference property In Section   we consider the con
sequences of using a less nondeterministic but more imple
mentable semantics of concurrency In Section   we discuss
some interactions among the noninterference property and
language semantics Finally  in Section   we discuss some
related work
 The Eect of Threads on Noninterference
Recently  the authors showed that a Denningstyle secure
ow analysis of imperative programs can be formulated as a
type system VSI For example  suppose that we wish to
support two security classes  L low and H high Then
we can use these security classes as the types of program
variables Thus  for variables x and y  we can say x  H to
indicate that x holds highsecurity information and y  L to
indicate that y holds lowsecurity information And then an
improper assignment like y  x can be caught as a type
error Note  however  that the opposite assignment x  y
should be allowed	 to deal with this we introduce subtyping
into our type system and say that L   H More subtly  the
type system must also guard against implicit information
ows  as seen in a program like
if evenx then y   else y   
which indirectly copies the last bit of x into y To deal
with such implicit ows  the type system also classies pro
gram commands as having either type H cmd or L cmd 	
intuitively  a command of type H cmd cannot transmit any
information to L variables and hence can safely be used in
the branches of a conditional whose guard has type H
In VSI  it is shown that the type system ensures that
every welltyped program c satises a noninterference prop
erty  which can be described as follows suppose that  and
 are two memories that agree on all L variables and that c









also agree on all
L variables Intuitively  this means that information cannot
leak from H variables to L variables  since the nal val
ues of L variables are independent of the initial values of H
variables

Furthermore  programs can be checked automat
ically for type correctness  by doing type inference VSb

It is possible however for information about H variables to leak
to an outside observer who can observe whether c halts aborts or
fails to terminate or how long c takes to terminate  See VSa for
some approaches to eliminating such covert information ows 
However  the language considered in VSI is sequen
tial  while mobile programs such as Java applets are often
multithreaded For this reason  it is important to extend
our analysis to deal with a multithreaded language and to
see how the noninterference property is aected by the pres
ence of concurrency This is the main goal of this paper
We begin with an example that shows that the type sys
tem of VSI is no longer su
cient to ensure noninterfer
ence if we extend our language with concurrent threads that
communicate via a shared memory The program  which
consists of three threads  is given in Figure  Assume that
PIN  H var and result  L var  Then each of the threads in
this program can be typed under the type system of VSI
The typing gives trigger  and trigger type H var   and
maintrigger and mask type L var 
But  if the program is run in a memory where initially
maintrigger    trigger     trigger    result 
  mask is a power a   and PIN is an arbitrary natural num
ber less twice mask  then  assuming that scheduling is fair
ie each thread is scheduled innitely often  the program
eventually halts with the value of PIN copied into result
Thus the noninterference property is violated
To restore the noninterference property in this concur
rent setting  we impose two new restrictions on the typing
of while loops we require that the guard of a while loop
have type L  and we require the while loop itself to get type
L cmd  The new restrictions succeed in ruling out the above
programsince trigger  and trigger have type H  they
cannot be used in the guards of the while loops in threads
 and 
In the next three sections  we develop these ideas pre
cisely  proving that the new restrictions on while loops are
su
cient to restore the noninterference property for multi
threaded programs
 Syntax and Semantics
Threads are written in the simple imperative language
phrases p  e j c













j   










while e do c
Metavariable x ranges over identiers and n over integer
literals Integers are the only values	 we use  for false and
nonzero for true Note that expressions are all pure ie
they do not cause side eects and total ie they do not
contain partial operations like division
The concurrent systems that we consider here consist
simply of a set of commands the threads that run concur
rently	 we do not consider facilities for creating new threads
Following the approach taken in Cli Joness o Jon 
we model a system of threads with an object map O  which
is simply a nite function from thread identiers        
to commands In addition  there is a single global memory
  shared by all threads  that maps identiers to integers
Note that in this simple context  we dont need to distin
guish identiers from locations The only way that threads
can interact is via the shared memory
In this paper  we assume for simplicity that expressions
are evaluated atomically Thus we simply extend a memory
 in the obvious way to map expressions to integers  writing
e to denote the value of expression e in memory  Note

 Thread 
while mask    do
while trigger     do

result  result  mask  bitwise or
trigger    
maintrigger  maintrigger	
if maintrigger   then trigger  
 Thread 
while mask    do
while trigger    do

result  result 
 mask  bitwise and with the complement of mask
trigger   
maintrigger  maintrigger	
if maintrigger   then trigger   
 Thread 
while mask    do
maintrigger   
if PIN 




while maintrigger   do

mask  mask  
trigger   
trigger  
Figure  A multithreaded program that leaks information

that e is always dened  provided that every identier
occurring in e is in the domain of   which will always be
the case if e is well typed
As in Gunter Gun  we dene the semantics of com
mands via transitions
update x  dom
































































loop e  




while e do c  
s
c	while e do c  
These rules dene a transition relation
s
 on con gura
tions A conguration is either a pair c   or simply a
memory  In the rst case  c is the command yet to be
executed	 in the second case  the command has terminated 















Next we have two rules specifying the global transitions
that can be made by a system of threads

























The semantics  at the global level  is thus purely nondeter
ministic At this point  we dont even require that schedul
ing be fair How to implement this semantics is an open
question	 this will be discussed further in Sections  and 
 The Type System
Here are the types used by our type system
data types 	  L j H
phrase types 
  	 j 	 var j 	 cmd
For simplicity  we limit the security classes here to just L
and H	 it is possible to generalize to an arbitrary partial
order of security classes
Our type system  whose rules are given in Figure   al
lows us to prove typing judgments of the form   p  
 as







denotes an identi er typing  which is a nite function from
identiers to phrase types
If   c  
 for some 
  then we say that c is well typed
under  Also  if O is well typed under  for every  
domO  then we say that O is well typed under 
As compared with the type system of VSI  the typ
ings of while loops are here restricted in two ways rst 
the guard of a while loop must have type L  and second 
the while loop itself can only get type L cmd 
 Type Soundness
We begin with three lemmas that establish the key proper
ties ensured by the type system	 these lemmas are then used
to prove that welltyped programs have the noninterference
property
Lemma   Simple Security If   e  L then every
identi er in e has class L
Proof By induction on the structure of e
Lemma   Connement If   c  H cmd then every
identi er assigned to in c has class H and c is guaranteed to
terminate successfully from any memory  where dom 
dom
Proof By induction on the structure of c  and using the fact
that c cannot contain any while loops







 then   c
 
 	 cmd
Proof By induction on the structure of c




  then it follows that   c
 

	 cmd and   c

 	 cmd  The argument for this is com
plicated somewhat by the presence of subtyping If the

























then by induction   c
 
 




	 c  	 cmd  If the transition is by the rst rule
sequence  the argument is simpler
If c is of the form while e do c
 
  then 	 must be L  and
we must have   c
 
 L cmd   and so   c
 









We also need a lemma about the execution of a sequential
composition















































Proof By induction on k
Denition   Given an identi er typing  we say that
memories  and  are equivalent written 
 
 if  
and  have the same domain and  and  agree on all L
identi ers
We also say that two commands are equivalent if this can
be shown from the following three rules











ident x  

  x  

int   n  	
r val   e  	 var
  e  	
sum   e
 








assign   x  	 var     e  	
  x  e  	 cmd
compose   c
 








if   e  	    c
 
 	 cmd     c

 	 cmd





while   e  L    c  L cmd
  while e do c  L cmd
























  p  
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Finally we extend equivalence to con gurations by de ning
c  
 





Why do we need a notion of equivalence on commands
Well  we are trying to show that executing a command twice 
from two equivalent memories  leads to equivalent memories
But to prove this property by induction on the number of
transitions  it is necessary to deal with the fact that the two
executions can proceed quite dierently  because condition
als with H guards need not follow the same branches in the
two executions For this reason  we must prove a more gen
eral property roughly speaking  equivalent congurations
go to equivalent congurations
Remark The need for clause  in the above denition
can be seen from the following example Suppose x  H 
d  L cmd   and 
 
 If  and  disagree about the value







	 d   under  and go to c








	 d  but these dont have type H cmd  End
of Remark
Theorem    Sequential Noninterference Suppose c
and d are well typed under  and c  
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 then there exists

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Proof By induction on the structure of c
We begin by dealing with the case when c and d both
have type H cmd  In this case  by the Connement Lemma






















d   This is because c
 
must
also have type H cmd by the Subject Reduction Lemma




  then we can appeal
again to the Connement Lemma to get that neither c nor
d assigns to any variables of type L  and that there exists 
 















We now deal with the case when c and d do not both
have type H cmd by considering in turn the possible forms
of c
Case x  e Since c and d do not both have type H cmd  
we must have c  d  and therefore c does not have
type H cmd  Hence x must have type L var and e
must have type L So  by the Simple Security Lemma 
every identier in e has class L Therefore  since 
 
 







 Since c and d do not both have type H cmd   d
































































































































We remark that the proof would break down here if while loops
were typed as in VSI  Under those rules d could contain while
loops and hence might not be assured of terminating 





 Since c and d do not both have
type H cmd   we must have c  d  and c does not have
type H cmd  Hence e  L As above  this implies that









then e  e is nonzero  so



























Case while e do c
 
 Since while loops cannot have type
H cmd   we must have c  d  and e  L Again  this im


























	while e do c
 
  
Remark The Sequential Noninterference theorem says
that if c  
 
d   and c   reaches a conguration in one
step  then d   reaches an equivalent conguration in zero
or more steps This bound cannot be strengthened For












have type H cmd   but c

has type L cmd  Suppose
further that c
 
   goes to 
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 And we need
d
 
to run to completion in order to get the required program
equivalence  since c
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under our denition of 
 
 End of Remark
We now wish to apply the Sequential Noninterference
Theorem to establish a Concurrent Noninterference Theo
rem We begin with a lemma  which depends crucially on
our nondeterministic scheduling  that shows that any execu
tion of a thread can be lifted to an execution of the global
system




























O    
 

Proof By induction on k









































































  O  c
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Remark This lemma remains true if we assume that
scheduling is fair  since we are dealing only with nite com
putations here But if we assume bounded fairness  so that
there is a xed bound b on the number of transitions a thread
can make before another thread gets a turn  then the lemma

































































































  then by inspection of the rules
global there exists  such that O
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Let d  O

 Then c  
 







So  in the rst case  by the Sequential Noninterference The




















































The second case is similar
Let fg denote the empty object map We can give a nal
corollary
Corollary   Suppose that O is well typed under  and

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Proof By an easy generalization of the Concurrent Non
























 fg by denition of 
 

 Adding a Clock to the Language
Many languages include a system clock that can be read by
a running program	 for instance  Java includes a function
SystemcurrentTimeMillis One would expect that such
a clock would have implications for secure information ow 
since it makes timing information observable internally In
this section  we explore this issue
To include a clock  we use a special identier t  initially
  which tells the number of transition steps that have been
made in the current program execution We can make t
readonly by giving it either type L or H  rather than L var
orH var  We must modify the semantics of some commands
to update t appropriately	 the modied transitions are given
in Figure 
Now  if we assume t  L  then we clearly run into trouble
with the noninterference property For example  suppose
that x  H  y  L  and c  H cmd is a command that takes 
steps to nish Consider the following program  which has
just one thread

update x  dom
x  e  
s
x  e  t  t  
branch e nonzero








  t  t  
e  








  t  t  
loop e  
while e do c  
s
t  t  
e nonzero
while e do c  
s
c	while e do c  t  t  
Figure  Modied transitions to maintain a clock t
if x   then c
if t    then y    else y  
Assuming that x is either  or  initially  this program copies
x into y By checking the value of t  the program can de
termine whether c was executed or not  which in turn tells
whether x   or not
But if we assume  instead  that t  H  then the above
program is illtyped  because the branches of the second
conditional do not have type H cmd  And  indeed  if t  H 
then the proof of Theorem  still goes through  and so the
noninterference property is preserved
 Other Scheduling Policies
The semantics of concurrency given by rule global is
purely nondeterministic	 the rule simply says that at ev
ery step  any thread can be selected to run for a step It
is important to understand that the noninterference results
of the last section depend crucially on this nondetermin
ism For example  Corollary  says that if 
 
 and there
is some way of scheduling the threads of O   that leads
to termination  then there is some way of scheduling the
threads of O   that leads to an equivalent result But the
two schedules can be very dierent In particular  even if the
rst schedule treats all threads equally in the sense that it
gives each thread a roughly equal amount of CPU time  the
second schedule might have to greatly favor one thread over
the others Therefore  if we impose additional constraints
on the way scheduling is done  we may falsify the Global
Execution Lemma and hence the noninterference property

For example  suppose that scheduling is done by round
robin time slicing  with a timeslice of b steps Let x  H
and y  L and consider the following two threads
 Thread 





Thus our situation is quite dierent from the usual one in which
one proves the correctness of a concurrent program with respect
to a nondeterministic scheduler  There one can immediately say
that the program is correct with respect to any scheduler that one
might care to implement because any schedule produced by an imple	
mented scheduler could have been produced by the nondeterministic
scheduler 
Suppose further that c  H cmd is a command that takes
longer than b steps to nish If x    x    and
y  y    then 
 
 And from   we can terminate
in a state where y    but from  we cannot	 from   we
can only terminate in a state where y  
In terms of our proofs  heres what is going on
if x   then c	 y    
s
y     
so by the Sequential Noninterference theorem there exists 
 
such that











 But  although O  
g
O  y      it




O  y    
 
  because
the timeslicing scheduler will not let thread  run for such
a long time without giving a turn to thread 
Another approach to scheduling is probabilistic One
might attempt to approximate the eect of rule global
by ipping coins at each step to select the next thread to
run While such an implementation is in some ways faithful
to rule global  the adoption of a probabilistic seman
tics makes it possible to create probabilistic covert channels
Gra  which cannot be addressed without rening the no
tion of noninterference This point is discussed in more de
tail in Section 
To preserve noninterference in the face of an arbitrary
scheduler  it appears necessary to require the guards of con
ditionals to have type L If this is done  we can strengthen
the Sequential Noninterference Theorem to the following
form
Theorem 
 Lockstep Execution Suppose c is well
typed under  and 
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 then there exists 
 












This Lockstep Execution result is strong enough to estab
lish Concurrent Noninterference  regardless of how schedul
ing is done Anything done under  can now be exactly
mirrored under  Also  Lockstep Execution implies that
we can add a clock t and even give it type L  since program
timing now cannot depend on the values of H variables Un
fortunately  restricting conditionals in this way is likely to
be quite burdensome in practice
On the other hand  it can be useful for guarding against
timing attacks Kocher  for example  describes a timing

attack on RSA modular exponentiation to learn a private
key Koc Such attacks are possible by merely knowing
the source code for an algorithm Typing conditionals as
restrictively as while loops rejects code susceptible to this
kind of attack
 A Closer Look at Noninterference
Our noninterference property basically says that the nal
values of low variables are independent of the initial val
ues of high variables More precisely  it says that changing
the initial values of high variables cannot aect the set of
possible nal values of low variables Hence  observing the
nal values of low variables cannot reveal anything about
the initial values of high variables
But consider the following example  which is given by
McLean McL Let x be a high variable whose value is






where rand   returns a random integer between  and

Now  this program satises our noninterference property
regardless of the value of x  the nal value of y can be any
integer between  and  But this program doesnt seem
to be secure If we were to run the program repeatedly  we
would expect a sequence of nal values for y something like
                  
and we would feel quite condent that in this case the
value of x is 
How can this be explained The answer is that we have
implicitly changed the semantics of our language from the
purely nondeterministic semantics of rule global to some
kind of probabilistic semantics In a nondeterministic se
mantics  outcomes are either possible or impossible  with
no further distinction But in a probabilistic semantics 
outcomes occur according to some probability distribution 
which makes it possible to make probabilistic inferences
In our example  if we assume that each thread has an
equal probability of being scheduled at each step and that
rand   generates all numbers in the range  to  with
equal probability  then we can see that the nal value of y
will be the initial value of x with probability    and
will be any other number between  and  with probabil
ity   Hence we can be condent of correctly guessing
the initial value of x by running the program repeatedly and
picking the most common nal value of y To rule out such
probabilistic inferences  we would need a more rened notion
of noninterference that requires that the probability distri
bution of the nal value of y be independent of the initial
value of x The program would not satisfy such a probabilis
tic notion of noninterference  because changes to the initial
value of x do change the distribution of the nal value of y
Thus we can see that the appropriate formulation of the
noninterference property depends on the kind of language
being considered In all cases  the idea is that the nal val
ues of low variables are independent of the initial values of
high variables For a deterministic language  this means that
changing the initial values of high variables cannot change
the nal values of low variables For a nondeterministic lan
guage  as considered in this paper  it means that changing
the initial values of high variables cannot change the set
of possible nal values of low variables And for a proba
bilistic language  it means that changing the initial values
of high variables cannot change the distribution of possible
nal values of low variables

It can  of course  be argued that a nondeterministic se
mantics as used in this paper is unrealistic  because any
real implementation would display probabilistic behavior
It is perhaps worth remarking that a nondeterministic se
mantics can be regarded as an abstraction of a probabilis
tic semantics in which one equates possible with occurs
with nonzero probability For instance  an implementa
tion of rule global that ips coins at each step to decide
which thread to run has the property that each thread has
a nonzero probability of being selected at each step Indeed 
any terminating execution possible under rule global has
a nonzero probability of occurring in the implementation
Therefore  Corollary  does hold for this implementation
However  one has to be careful with this view of possibility
Though the corollary assures us that  under such an im
plementation  one can never be certain of the initial values
of high variables based on observing the nal values of low
variables  it does not mean that one cannot guess the initial
values with high probability
It is also worth remarking that thread  in the example
above is rejected by our type system This suggests that
welltyped programs in our system  if given a probabilistic
semantics  might perhaps satisfy some sort of probabilistic
noninterference property But it is easy to see that our type
system would not rule out probabilistic timing channels For
example  suppose x is a high varible whose value is either 
or   y is a low variable  and c is a high command that takes
a long time to execute Consider the following two threads
 Thread 





If thread scheduling works by ipping a coin at each step
to decide which thread to run  then with high probability
the two threads run at about the same rate Hence  with
high probability the value of x ends up being copied into
y Extending our type system to deal with a probabilistic
language remains an area for future study
Finally  it is well known that in some cases noninterfer
ence is too restrictive In particular  noninterference cannot
accommodate information downgrading For example  infor
mation is eectively downgraded when it is encrypted The

In the security literature there have been many noninterference	
like properties proposed  Noninterference was 
rst proposed by
Goguen and Meseguer GM for deterministic systems  Later
McCullough McC proposed Generalized Noninterference and Re	
strictiveness for nondeterministic systems and Gray Gra Gra
proposed P	Restrictiveness and Information Flow Security for prob	
abilistic systems  See also McLean McL for a comparison of
some of these properties and Wittbold and Johnson WJ for
an information	theoretic account of possibilistic and probabilistic
noninterference 

problem is that ciphertext is sensitive to changes in high
cleartext  yet we would often like to treat the ciphertext as
low This is a clear violation of noninterference McL
	 Related Work
Analyzing code for various security properties has a long
history Denning Den  Den  DD developed a form
of program certication for detecting secure ow violations
in code It was inspired by the work of Bell and LaPadula
BL  Fenton Fen  and Lampson Lam  among oth
ers There is also the classic operating systems protection
work of Harrison  Ruzzo  and Ullman who showed that the
problem of determining whether a program  comprised of
simple primitives for updating an access matrix  leaks an
access right is undecidable HRU See also DDG


for an excellent discussion about solvability and complexity
issues associated with formal systems for reasoning about
program security
More recently  there is the work of He and Gligor HG
who describe ways to eliminate timing channels in the source
code of trusted computing bases using an automated tool
Ban!atre  Bryce  and Le M"etayer BBLM attempt to treat
secure information ow in a nondeterministic setting	 they
give a compiletime technique for detecting ow violations
in sequential programs
Other more recent eorts are more closely related to our
work in that they too attempt to characterize some sort of
security analysis as a formal system of types Palsberg and
#rb$k P# have developed a system to manage trust
in the lambda calculus It is not clear what an appropri
ate notion of type soundness is for their trust system  given
that explicit coercions between trusted and untrusted enti
ties are available in the core calculus Any suitable notion
should speak to security in some way Abadi Aba has
developed a system of typing rules for ensuring secrecy in
cryptographic protocols These protocols are expressed in
an extension of the pi calculus called spi Type soundness is
that of testing equivalence between two terms P and P
 
 
where  and 
 
are substitutions of values for variables and
P is a welltyped spi term In other words  no other spi term 
called an observer  can distinguish P from P
 
 Heintze
and Riecke HR attempt to rene Dennings analysis us
ing more detailed type structure They also extend their
type system for a concurrent language but do not treat type
soundness in this case Finally  Myers and Liskov ML
describe a decentralized approach to downgrading informa
tion in a secure information ow setting  but its soundness




It is clear that with just ordinary thread implementations 
users can exploit seemingly innocuous features like thread
priorities and scheduling to easily build reliable covert chan
nels An otheshelf implementation of Java is more than
enough here Furthermore  the bandwidth of such channels
is not an issue  for private keys and credit card numbers
require little bandwidth A truly secure programming lan
guage demands fundamental changes in language design and
an understanding of the relationship between semantics and
security
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